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Abstract
The BPCG model provides an interesting hypothesis regarding economic growth. The
main implication is that world demand places a constraint on individual country performance.
I discuss this implication and argue that tests of the BPCG model have essentially been tests
of the hypothesis that trade is balanced over the long run; a plausible hypothesis but one
that need not hold mainly due to demand-side constraints. I then discuss the role of relative
prices and investment, point out logical inadequacies in the traditional BPCG framework, and
suggest an alternative theoretical framework to investigate its robustness. Our theoretical and
empirical explorations contribute to reconciling evidence supporting the BPCG hypothesis with
recent work that consistently nds an important role for the level of the real exchange rate and
investment, independently of world demand growth.
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1 Introduction
The idea of a balance of payments constraint on growth has been a staple of much demand side-
oriented growth theory since Thirlwall (1979). Later work has incorporated capital ows, transi-
tional dynamics, non-tradable goods, and sectoral issues.1 Indeed, the idea of a foreign exchange
constraint has been part and parcel of heterodox approaches and predates the Balance of Payments
Constrained Growth (BPCG) model. However, it is the role of the demand side in dening the
nature of the constraint that mainly distinguishes the BPCG model from other frameworks. The
basic idea is generally expressed in three versions, one incorporating relative prices, albeit as ex-
ogenously given, while the others ignore this aspect (see the next section). The common thread
binding the three versions is the idea that domestic growth is a positive function of world demand
growth as mediated through the relevant demand elasticities.
Logically, the BPCG hypothesis can be said to incorporate three sub-hypotheses:
1. Growth is limited by the balance of payments (BP) constraint
2. The BP constraint originates from the demand side
3. Relative prices either do not matter or matter only in the form of rate of change rather than
levels.
Hypothesis (1) is quite plausible, especially for developing countries due to their relative inability
to borrow in own currency, limited monetary sovereignty, and lack of depth in nancial markets.
Indeed this feature was recognized and analyzed by earlier gap models in the context of developing
countries. The constraint, however, need not come from world demand. For example, in traditional
structuralist literature, where growth in the South is constrained by capital, Southern terms of trade
may adjust to satisfy the constraint. Hypotheses (2) and (3), therefore, need to be theoretically
and empirically examined. One implication that follows from hypothesis (2), as incorporated in
the BPCG framework, is that domestic growth is a positive function of global growth (although the
magnitude of the correlation may vary depending on the relevant elasticities). As discussed below,
the data indicate that this rather intuitive prediction is frequently not veried. Moreover, contra
to hypothesis (3), there is accumulating evidence in the literature that relative prices, especially
the level of the real exchange rate dened as the relative price of tradables matter signicantly.
This paper investigates the theoretical and empirical validity of the BPCG framework. I present
and use a general framework to focus on hypotheses (2) and (3). The main assumptions that
distinguish the BPCG model are identied and explored in light of existing literature, theory, and
evidence. Existing econometric studies of the hypotheses are found lacking in several respects. A
preliminary and far from exhaustive, econometric treatment is carried out to investigate the e¤ect
of alternative variables suggested by the general framework. Finally, based on the theoretical
framework and econometric exercises, guidelines are laid out for future work to more robustly
evaluate the nature of the BP constraint in general, and the validity of the BPCG framework in
particular.
1On capital ows, see, for example, Thirlwall and Hussain (1982) and Moreno-Brid (1998). Razmi (2010) and
Araujo and Lima (2007) discuss aspects of the BPCG model in a multi-sector set-up.
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2 The constraint and adjustment mechanisms
As mentioned earlier, the idea of an equilibrating mechanism to ensure that output growth does
not exceed a pace dened by the external balance is an eminently plausible one. A look at regional
data, as presented in Table 1, for example, reveals small average current account decits for the
period 1980-2013 for most regions.2
Table 1: Regional current account balances averaged over 1980-2012. Source: Authors calculations
based on the UNCTAD Handbook of Statistics
Developing Of which Developed Of which
Africa America Asia Oceania America Asia Europe Oceania
0.71 -0.32 -1.65 1.99 -3.05 -0.64 -2.59 2.45 0.27 -4.29
Given the relatively limited range in which the current account varies for most countries, the
question is: what adjusts to maintain this range? One answer can be traced back to Chenery and
Strout (1966). The gap models emerging from this seminal contribution generally identied two
constraints on development: the saving gap and the foreign exchange gap. Since most developing
countries rely on foreign exchange for needed capital goods and intermediate industrial inputs,
successive current account decits generated by growth become unsustainable over longer periods
of time. Alternatively, a country may have adequate foreign exchange but insu¢ cient savings to
exploit available investment opportunities. Generally the foreign exchange constraint was seen
as the binding one. Thus, the balance of payments rather than capacity utilization emerges as a
constraint on growth. The need to import capital goods hinders accumulation given limited foreign
exchange availability. Indeed countries were typically assumed to be producing at full capacity in
earlier models, although Taylor (1994) and others later dropped this assumption in favor of more
Keynesian closures.
Another strand of development literature see, for example, Dutt (1990) analyzes the e¤ects
of North-South trade on development. Balanced trade is often assumed. Again, this literature,
even though mostly originating in non-mainstream circles, typically postulates capital as the binding
constraint on the South, with the Southern terms of trade adjusting to equilibrate the goods market.
Indeed, the Prebisch-Singer hypothesis, too has often been stated along the following lines: given
balanced trade, unequal elasticities of demand for the two regionsexports means that either the
two regions grow at the same rate and the Southern terms of trade decline, or the terms of trade
remain stable but the North grows faster. The potential complementarity of relative output and
price changes is an issue that we return to in the next section.
Thus, a substantial body of development literature, not to mention international trade theory,3
has traditionally assumed balanced trade over the long run, with di¤erent variables adjusting to
respect this constraint. The BPCG model follows in the same tradition except that the claim is not
limited to developing countries.4 Moreover, output growth is postulated as the overwhelmingly
2The variation in values for individual countries is much larger, with extreme outliers ranging from an average
current account decit of 34 percent for Anguilla to a surplus of 166 percent for Timor-Leste, but most of these
appear to be driven by short time series and/or other special circumstances. Most of the countries (106 out of 196)
lie within the 5 percent range.
3 In the standard Ricardian trade model, for example, relative wages (measured in the same currency) adjust in
response to changes in international preferences, technologies, etc., to maintain balanced trade. See, for example,
Dornbusch et al. (1977).
4 Indeed the initial tests of the model involved developed countries only (see Thirlwall (1979)).
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dominant adjusting variable, with (changes in) relative prices playing a secondary role. To see this,
it might be useful to derive the basic hypothesis in the form that is typically tested.
Start with trade equations of the imperfect substitutes form,
XD = g

PX
EPM
; Y 

; g1 < 0, g2 > 0 (1)
MD = 

PX
EPM
; Y

; 1, 2 > 0 (2)
where XD and MD represent export and import demand, PX and PM are the corresponding
prices, E is the nominal exchange rate (the price of foreign currency in terms of the domestic one),
and Y and Y  are domestic and foreign income, respectively. The assumption here is that each
country/region makes one good that it consumes domestically and exports. Imposing the balanced
trade condition, i.e.,
PXX
D = EPMM
D (3)
yields, after log-di¤erentiation to derive variables in growth rate form,
Y^BPCG1 =  X + M   1
M
(P^X   P^M   E^) + X
M
Y^  (4)
where the hats or circumexes denote growth rates, and i and i (i = X;M) represent the relevant
price and income elasticities. We have one equilibrium condition to go with one adjusting variable,
Y^ , with the assumption of perfectly elastic export and import supply responses rendering relative
prices in domestic currency terms exogenous (more on this later). Assuming that movements in
the international terms of trade P^X   P^M   E^ are negligible helps simplify the expression to:
Y^BPCG2 =
X
M
Y^  (5)
The use of equation (1) in log-di¤erentiated form again with P^X   P^M   E^ = 0 helps derive
an even more concise expression.
Y^BPCG3 =
X^
M
(6)
Equations (5) and (6) capture the gist of the BPCG approach, and have formed the basis for
much empirical work. The idea, as discussed in more detail below, is that producers set prices in
domestic currency, nominal exchange rates are xed by policy, and domestic output growth does
the adjusting in the presence of external imbalances. Crucially, the adjustment of domestic output
growth is in response to world output growth, either explicitly via equation (5), or implicitly, via
equation (6).
Before we look more closely at the data, a few comments about existing empirical tests are
in order. While testing the BPCG hypothesis, step 1 consists typically of estimating an import
demand function:
M^ = ^0 + M Y^ + M (P^X   P^M   E^) + 
3
Now suppose, as in the small country case (see below), relative price changes are negligibly small
(P^X   P^M   E^  0). Then, the expression reduces to:
M^ = ^0 + M Y^ +  (7)
Having estimated M , step 2 then typically consists of estimating equation (6). Consider the
implications. Ignoring the residual term , which is expected to have a mean of zero, M =
(M^   0)=Y^ . Plugging this into equation ((6) yields:
Y^BPCG3 =
X^
M^   ^0
Y^
or, in other words, as long as the trade balance is relatively stable over time, the BPCG growth
rate will be highly correlated with the actual growth rate. Moreover, if changes in autonomous
imports (0) are small, the correlation will approach unity.
Other studies base their tests on equation (5). This requires the additional estimation of an
export demand equation.
X^ = ^0 + X Y^
 +  (8)
Now eqs. (5), (7), and (8) imply that
Y^BPCG2 =
X^   ^0
M^   ^0
Y^
Again, the structure of the test facilitates a high correlation between the two growth rates as
long as the trade balance is stable over time. Put di¤erently, the traditional approach to testing
the BPCG model is really a test of whether or not trade is balanced!
As discussed earlier, nearly balanced trade over the long run is a plausible approximation. Better
approaches are required to address the more interesting question: what mechanisms constrain
growth given a balance of payments constraint? It is time now to pursue one such approach.
3 The nature of the constraint
Equation (5) directly presents a hypothesis; individual country growth rates are a positive func-
tion of world growth, the constant of proportionality depending on the relevant income elasticities
of demand. This hypothesis is quite intuitive, and must by denition hold on average (since
the world growth rate is an average of individual country growth rates). Moreover, it is easy
to test. Perhaps surprisingly then, this prediction is negated in a signicant number of cases.
Using individual country data from the Penn World Tables (PWT 8.0), I calculated the world
GDP as the sum of individual country GDPs. I then found geometric means for 5-year samples
in order to minimize short-run cyclical movements. Figure 1 shows the resulting scatter plot be-
tween individual country growth rates and the world growth rate. The wagon-wheel" pattern
reveals something interesting; in many cases, as testied by the dense packing of near-vertical
plots, individual country growth, RGDPNA_GROWTH, is largely independent of world growth,
WORLD_RGDPNA_GROWTH. In almost a third of the cases (49 out of 167), the correlation
is negative!
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Figure 1: Invidual country versus world growth, 1950-20011. Source: PWT 8.0.
What is going on? Indeed, under certain conditions it is possible for income to decline following
a rise in external demand for a countrys products. This happens, for example, if the substitution
elasticities are very low both on the supply and demand sides, or if there are common shocks to the
non-tradable sector across the world.5 In reality, the reasons may vary from country to country,
although the case of China, the most talked about recent success story, may be illustrative (see
Figure 2). China grew relatively slowly when global growth was robust in the 1950s and 60s, and
grew rapidly when global growth was less impressive in the 80s, 90s, and 2000s. Obviously the
underlying story involves something more than the growth of world demand. The gure hints
at one such story. The correlation between Chinese output and accumulation growth is robustly
positive.
Figure 3 illustrates the Chinese story from a di¤erent angle. Notice once again how the periods
of boom and low growth in China di¤er from similar ups and downs in global demand. In addition
notice how periods of high (low) growth generally coincide with high (low) capital accumulation
(RKNA_GROWTH). We will have more to say about capital accumulation in the next two
sections.
5See Razmi (2010) for a more detailed discussion.
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Figure 2: Chinese growth vs. (1) world growth, (2) accumulation. Calculations based on 5-year
averages. Source: PWT 8.0.
4 The role of relative prices
Relative prices are often ignored in the BPCG framework on the grounds either that: (1) they change
little over time, or (2) price elasticities of demand are low, or (3) since it is changes in relative prices
that matter (see equation (4)), successful growth would involve continuous depreciation rather than
a one time change; such a scenario is unsustainable. These three explanations are logically distinct,
and in some circumstances (1) and (2) may even be mutually inconsistent.6 Point (2) may render
impotent even large relative price changes. Large price elasticities of demand, on the other hand,
may magnify the impact of small price changes. Thus, it is important to look at these assumptions
in isolation.
As we show in the next section, (1) would imply the small country, price taking assumption,
with innitely elastic export demand and import supply elasticities. But in this case world demand
growth becomes irrelevant! In a Keynesian price setting framework, with innitely elastic export
supplies, relative prices will change with the nominal exchange rate when measured in the same
currency.7
Point (2), i.e., low demand elasticities, postulates that price elasticities of demand fail to satisfy
the Marshall-Lerner condition. This does not render relative prices irrelevant. In fact, a logical
implication that few economists would support as a policy implication thanks to a large body of
6For example, as discussed later, the small country case involves small price changes exactly because elasticities
are high.
7Which is why nominal exchange rate changes have proportional e¤ects on the real exchange rate in rigid price
Keynesian models.
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Figure 3: Trends in Chinese growth, capital accumulation, and global growth. Source: PWT 8.0.
empirical ndings is to maintain an appreciated real exchange rate. But suppose the magnitude
of elasticities is indeed such that X+M  1, dampening the e¤ects of relative price changes. The
magnitude of trade elasticities is an empirical question that could at least potentially be addressed
econometrically. Empirical work to date has been inconclusive although recent studies have tended
to nd long-run demand elasticities high enough to satisfy the Marshall-Lerner condition.8 More-
over, it su¤ers from weaknesses such as the likely endogeneity of relative prices and the failure to
take into account supply-side issues while estimating trade parameters.
Turning to supply-side price elasticities, both the BPCG framework and the Marshall-Lerner
condition assume innitely high export supply elasticities. But how plausible is this? One could
argue that, for the typical country, it is quite reasonable to assume that the elasticity of supply from
the rest of the world is innitely high, i.e., the typical country is a price taker in the import market.
The plausibility of high elasticities on the export supply side is much more questionable, especially
once one thinks outside the very short run. It would require a deeply and permanently depressed
economy with persistent underutilization of resources, especially capital. This is implausible for
most advanced economies, not to speak of developing ones. In fact, traditional structuralist
literature, even when coming from economists with Keynesian leanings, has emphasized low supply
price elasticities for Southern countries.9 This is in direct contrast to the BPCG assumption. The
former assumption is also more consistent with the assumption of full capacity utilization for the
South typically made by structuralist models.10
The issue of supply-side elasticities is relevant to that of low estimated demand elasticities. As
8See, for example, Hooper et al. (2000) and Bahmani-Oskoee and Niroomand (1998) for studies with large numbers
of countries.
9See Prebisch (1950), Singer (1950), and related literature, for example.
10See Blecker (1996), Dutt (1990), and Taylor (1983), for example.
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discussed in the next section, with fully specied export and import good markets, relative prices are
endogenous. Empirical studies of the BPCG model, however, do not estimate equations based on
reduced form solutions. Instead, the assumption of an innite price elasticity of supply removes the
need to include supply-side variables. As Orcutt (1950) pointed out a long time ago, this is likely to
introduce a signicant downward bias in estimates of price elasticities. The reason is simple and can
be intuitively explained. With an upward-sloping supply curve and a downward-sloping demand
curve, demand-side shocks will create a positive correlation between export prices and equilibrium
quantities while supply-side shocks will create a negative correlation. Econometric estimates that
regress prices on quantities are likely to nd the average e¤ect, which, unless the former source of
shocks is negligible, is likely to be misleadingly low. While the neglect of supply-side adjustments
in estimating trade equations has traditionally been justied by the paucity of data, this argument
is less tenable today, and recent studies although none to my knowledge in the BPCG tradition
have begun to address this issue.11
On a related note, a broader question emerging from our earlier discussion is that of whether it
is the level or rate of change of prices that matters. Based on equation (4), modelers in the BPCG
tradition have argued that, if anything, it is the latter. This, however, is in conict with a growing
body of theoretical and empirical literature that has shown that output growth and investment are
a positive function of the degree of real undervaluation, although this result tends to hold much
more robustly for developing countries. This literature typically denes the relevant price as that
of tradables relative to non-tradables. The tradable sector is generally associated with industrial
production while agricultural products rendered non-tradable in many cases by country regulations
and services constitute the bulk of non-tradables. If there is anything special about the tradable
sector, then shifting resources toward this sector through the appropriate relative price signal can
have benecial consequences. Rodrik (2008), for example, hypothesizes that the tradable sector is
subject to market imperfections to a greater extent. Boosting protability in this sector through
a policy of undervaluation could, therefore, act as a second best policy to achieve growth. Razmi
et al. (2012), on the other hand, focus more on the presence of underemployed labor in developing
economies where a modern industrial sector exists along with the traditional non-tradable sector.
Boosting protability through real undervaluation in such an economy can generate accumulation,
growth, and industrial employment. These studies nd positive and statistically signicant e¤ects
of undervaluation on growth and investment, respectively.12 Once again, China is not a bad choice
for illustration (see Figure 4 below). Continuously depreciating the real exchange rate may not be
required to deliver the goods.13
In sum, reasons (1) and (2), as stated above, are logically distinct and should not be mixed up.
Regarding (1), the role of relative prices is logically inconsistent in the BPCG model, since constant
and exogenous relative prices, i.e., purchasing power parity (PPP), is a small country assumption.
If actual historical data indicate minimal relative price changes, that arguably supports the PPP
view of the world. Regarding (2), if supply and demand both matter, then relative prices are
11See, for example, Cheung et al. (2009), who estimate that a one percent increase in the Chinese manufacturing
capital stock  used as a proxy for export supply capacity induces between a 2.2 -2.5% increase in real exports.
Catão and Falcetti (2002) nd an export supply elasticity nearing unity for Argentina.
12Other relevant works include Hausmann et al. (2005), Levy-Yeyati and Sturzenegger (2007), Polterovich and
Popov (2002), Frenkel and Ros (2006), and Porcile and Lima (2010).
13No pun intended. On a related note, Freund and Pierola (2008) nd, based on a comprehensive sample, that
real depreciations are associated with export accelerations. Changes in relative price levels, in other words, may
generate sustained changes in the growth rates of exports. We do not pursue this matter here in the interest of
maintaining focus.
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Figure 4: Scatter plots for China of the degree of undervaluation vs. (1) GDP growth (left panel),
and (2) accumulation (growth of capital stock) (right panel). Source: PWT 8.0
endogenous, and there is likely to be a downward bias in the standard estimates of price elasticities.
In any event, this is an empirical question. Most studies have only estimated demand side equations
with relative prices treated as exogenous. The assumption required for this, i.e., innite supply
elasticities, is at least as strong as that underlying the PPP doctrine. Regarding (3), there is
growing evidence that when it comes to relative prices the level rather than, or in addition to,
changes may matter for protability and investment.
Finally, we end this section on a broader note, by stepping back for one more look at the question
of output versus relative price adjustment in the face of external imbalances. It is often argued that
output adjustments tend to overwhelmingly dominate. As pointed out before, this runs counter
to much structuralist literature concerning North-South interactions. Moreover, empirical data
indicate, at least in the case of dramatic events, that relative prices do adjust. Figures 4 and 5
illustrate such adjustments. Notice the large real depreciation in Mexico coincident with the crises
of 1981-82 and 1994, and similar developments in Brazil (1982 and 1999), and Argentina (2002).
In the case of the two East/Southeast Asian economies, notice the large depreciations following the
Asian crisis of 1997-8.
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CPI-based real exchange rates. Source: World Development Indicators
Figure 5: CPI-based real exchange rates. Source: World Devlopment Indicators
Simultaneous adjustment in output and relative prices, dramatically illustrated here for the
case of large movements, is not surprising. As argued by Krugman (1988), output and relative
price adjustments are better seen as complements rather than substitutes.14 The reason can be
intuitively explained with the aid of a simple example. Consider a two country world and suppose
that removal of a trade imbalance between the two countries requires a transfer of expenditure
equivalent to $1 billion dollars from Country A to the rest of the world (ROW). Suppose further
that the marginal propensity to spend on domestic goods is 0.8 in Country A. Then a $1 billion
cut in expenditure in Country A translates into a fall in demand for that countrys good worth
$800 billion. What must be the marginal propensity to import in ROW to avoid an excess supply
14An earlier discussion of these issues, which came to be known as the transfer problem" emerged from the debates
between Keynes and Bertil Ohlin on the German reparation issue.
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of goods in Country A? The answer obviously is 0.8.15 But such a high marginal propensity
runs in the face of all evidence that points to a home bias in consumption (not to mention the
fact that most domestic goods are typically non-traded). Suppose more plausibly instead that the
marginal propensity to import in ROW too is 0.2. This means that the transfer of spending power
increases ROW demand for the Home good by $200 billion. We end up with an excess supply of
Country A goods worth $600 billion,. Over time, faster growth in ROW may increase expenditure
su¢ ciently to remove the excess supply, but barring the situation where ROW has high levels of
excess capacity, relative prices will have to give during the transition. To borrow John Williamsons
evocative phrase, the idea of an immaculate transferis too good to be true.
5 Issues of causation
It is now time to summarize the previous discussion, and expand on its implications, with the help
of a simple framework that captures both supply and demand side issues. This section presents the
framework and shows that relative prices are constant only in the small country case. Moreover,
while it is the growth of world demand that matters for domestic output growth in the BPCG
case (i.e., perfectly elastic supply with under-utilized resources), this is no longer true in the small
country case where the relevant variable instead is the rate of domestic capital accumulation. The
theoretical implications for the testing of the BPCG model are then drawn out as a segue to the
preliminary empirical exploration carried out in the next section.
Consider trade supply and demand equations of the standard form:16
XS = f(PX ;K); f1, f2 > 0 (9)
XD = g

PX
EPM
; Y 

; g1 < 0, g2 > 0 (10)
MS = (PM ); 0 > 0 (11)
MD = 

PX
EPM
; Y

; 1, 2 > 0 (12)
where K denotes a scale variable, such as the level of the capital stock, that reects the capacity to
export.17 The inclusion of nominal rather than relative prices in the supply functions reects the
simplifying assumption that each country produces a single good and imports the other one, i.e.,
there is no substitution between exportables and importables on the production side.
The exportable market clearing condition then becomes:
XS = XD = X
which, after log-di¤erentiating, yields
15 I use a numerical exercise here for intuition but the conclusions will hold as long as the marginal propensities to
import for the two areas add up to less than unity, that is, as long as there is some home bias in at least one country.
16Notice that equations (10) and (12) are the same as eqs. (1) and (2) dened earlier but we re-state them here
for convenience.
17This could be interpreted as reecting the stylized fact that the tradable industrial sector is generally the more
capital-intensive one, especially in developing countries.
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P^X =
X(P^M + E^)  KK^ + X Y^ 
X + "X
(13)
where X is the price elasticity of demand for our exports, "X is the corresponding price elasticity
of supply, and K and X are the scale elasticities of supply and demand.
Similarly, the market equilibrium condition for importables yields,
P^M =
X(P^X   E^) + M Y^
M + "M
(14)
Finally, the trade balance condition rounds out the framework:
PXX = EPMM
or, after log di¤erentiating,
P^M =
1 + "X
1 + "M
P^X   1
1 + "M
E^ (15)
Equations (13), (14), and (15) yield three equations in P^X , P^M , and Y^ . Substituting the latter
into (13) yields the reduced form solution for P^X .
P^X =
X"M E^   (1  X + "M )KK^ + (1 + "M )X Y^ 
(X + "X)"M + (1  X)"X
(16)
Next, from equations (16) and (15),
P^M =   (1  X)"XE^   (1  X)KK^ + (1 + "X)X Y^

(X + "X)"M + (1  X)"X
(17)
Before we derive the expression for output growth, it would be worthwhile to highlight some
implications:
1. First, with an innite elasticity of world supply of our imports (i.e., "M  !1), an assumption
shared by the BPCG and small country models,
P^X =
X
X + "X
E^ +
X
X + "X
Y^  (18)
P^M =   (1  X)"XE^   (1  X)KK^ + (1 + "X)X Y^

(X + "X)"M + (1  X)"X
(19)
2a Furthermore, with "X  !1 (i.e., the BPCG case), P^X = P^M = 0.
2b Alternatively, with X  !1 (the small country case), P^X = E^, while P^M = 0
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Notice rst that, in the general case, relative prices are endogenous and are constant only in
the small country case.18 A nominal devaluation has no e¤ect in the latter case on relative prices
when measured in the same currency unit, i.e., the terms of trade are exogenous. In the BPCG
case, 2a, P^X  E^  P^M =  E^, i.e., a nominal devaluation a¤ects relative prices equiproportionately.
Second, due to their di¤erent underlying assumptions, PPP cannot be used to justify the omission
of relative prices while deriving the BPCG expression. Third, in the BPCG case, it is demand-side
price elasticities (X , M ) that come into play while in the small country case, it is the supply side
elasticity "X that matters. This is exactly because, in the BPCG case, relative prices change, so
that demand side substitution comes into play via eqs. (10) and (12). In the small country case, a
nominal devaluation translates into a rise in the domestic export price but does not cause relative
price changes, so that the supply of exportables rises (via equation (9)) without a¤ecting demand.
Finally, turning to output growth, from (13), (14), and (17),
Y^ =
(X + M   1)"M
(X + "X)"M + (1  X)"X
"X
M
E^ +
(X + M   1)"M
(X + "X)"M + (1  X)"X
K
M
K^ +
(M + "M )"X + (1  M )"M
(X + "X)"M + (1  X)"X
X
M
Y^  (20)
Implications under alternative scenarios:
1With "M  !1 (both BPCG and small country case),19
Y^ =
X + M   1
X + "X
"X
M
E^ +
X + M   1
X + "X
K
M
K^ +
"X + 1  M
X + "X
X
M
Y^ 
2a Furthermore, with "X  !1 (BPCG case),
Y^ =
X + M   1
M
E^ +
X
M
Y^ 
2b Alternatively, with X  !1 (small country case),
Y^ =
"X
M
E^ +
K
M
K^
In the BPCG case, world growth (demand) matters whereas in the small country case, it is
domestic capital accumulation via growth in the capacity to export.20 To the extent that investment
(normalized by the level of capital stock) is a function of the prot rate in the exportable/tradable
sector, which in turn is a function of the relative price of the tradable/exportable product (Home
doesnt produce the importable), the growth rate is a function of the level of relative prices. Thus,
18Notice from 2b that P^X   E^   P^M = 0.
19Recall that X + M   1 is the Marshall-Lerner condition (which is derived assuming innite export supply
elasticities).
20The appearance of the nominal exchange rate as a determinant of growth of real output may appear a bit
puzzling. Recall that changes in the nominal exchange rate translate into real changes in the BPCG set-up. Since
producers set prices in their own currency, a change in the nominal exchange rate turns into a change in the relative
price facing consumers. In the small country case, by contrast, a nominal exchange rate change translates into a
change in the domestic currency export price facing producers.
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ultimately, it is the level of the real exchange rate that partly drives growth in the small country
case. More realistically, it is a combination of these factors that drives growth, although one might
argue that the drivers will vary across economies and with the time horizon under consideration.
If relative prices and investment matter, then arises the question of causation. Given output
adjustment that respects the balance of payments constraint, at least two channels emerge:
(1) In the traditional BPCG story, causation is based on Case 2aand ows from world demand
growth to exports, and from there to income growth and the ability to import capital goods.
(2) In an alternative story, based on equation (2b), the causation ows from accumulation
(perhaps involving capital goods imports) to an increase in output growth and the capacity to
export (and import), thus avoiding running into balance of payments problems.21
It is time for a preliminary look at the data.
6 Preliminary empirical exploration
Ideally, one would like to estimate reduced form equations such as eqs. (17) - (20) to gain some idea
of the magnitudes of parameters. The scope of the present paper precludes such an e¤ort. However,
the previous section suggests ve variables on which to base a preliminary empirical exploration:
(1) world demand growth in real terms, (2) relative price changes, (3) capital stock growth, (4) real
exchange rate levels, and of course, (5) real domestic income growth. I obtained data for these
variables from the Penn World Tables (PWT 8.0). Table 2 provides a data dictionary. I have data
for 167 countries for the period 1950-2011. All data are averaged over 5 year periods, except for
the period (2005-11), which spans seven years.
Lets begin with a look at the correlation matrix (Table 3). The correlation that stands out
with a magnitude of 0.60 is the positive one between the growth of domestic capital stock and
domestic output. The correlation between domestic and world GDP growth is also positive but,
at 0.17, much lower.22 Simple correlations may be misleading, of course. We need to dig deeper.
21This is essentially the mechanism at work in Razmi et al. (2012).
22Notice that the variable capturing world growth, WORLD_RGDPNA_GROWTH includes data for the entire
world, and hence has the same value for all countries in a given year. Changing the calculation of this variable
so as to exclude the GDP data for each individual country for which the world growth rate is calculated makes no
noticeable di¤erence to any of our results. The correlation between the two growth rate series is almost perfect.
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Table 4 presents estimates from regressions based on the following general form of equation (20):
RGDPNA_GROWTHi = '0 + '1 WORLD_RGDPNA_GROWTH + '2 RKNA_GROWTHi +
'3 RPLX_GROWTHi + fi +  (21)
Column (1) presents estimates from a simple regression involving national growth rates, a constant
term, and the world growth rate. Heterogeneity across cross-sections is addressed through a xed
e¤ects specication, although I cannot control for time xed e¤ects due to the presence of the world
growth rate term. Columns (2)-(4) introduce additional variables. Columns (5)-(8) incorporate
lags and another control variable discussed earlier, i.e., the (log of) degree of real undervaluation
(LNUNDERV AL).23
Lets start with the simplest possible specication. Column (1) presents the estimates derived
withWORLD_RGDPNA_GROWTH as the only regressor. The coe¢ cient on the world growth
rate is positive and signicant at the one percent level. A one percentage point increase in the world
growth rate increases average country growth by 0.55 percentage points. However, this coe¢ cient
declines somewhat once we add RKNA_GROWTH as an additional explanatory variable, which
has a coe¢ cient of 0.58, and is signicant at the one percent level (see Column (2)). Indeed,
column (3) shows that the standardized coe¢ cient for accumulation is more than three times that
of world growth.24
Columns (4) and (5) introduce the growth of relative export price (RPLX_GROWTH) and
LNUNDERV AL, respectively. As shown earlier, the former is an endogenous variable unless
we make the small country assumption. In keeping with tests of the BPCG hypothesis, I treat
it as exogenous here, although we relax this assumption shortly. Both variables are insigni-
cant, even though the signs accord with prior expectations. The negative sign associated with
RPLX_GROWTH is what one would expect if the Marshall-Lerner condition is satised. The
positive sign associated with LNUNDERV AL is consistent with the literature on real underval-
uation and growth discussed earlier, although some of the e¤ect of this variable on growth via
investment may already be captured by the inclusion of RKNA_GROWTH.
Columns (6) incorporates rst lags of the regressors in order to address the issue of slow adjust-
ment over time. The lower panel of the table shows the long-run coe¢ cients (which in this case
are simply the sum of the individual coe¢ cients). Again, the long-run coe¢ cients for both scale
variables are positive and signicant. However, as Column (7) shows, the e¤ect of accumulation
is much greater than that of world growth (standardized coe¢ cients of 0.46 versus 0.11). The ef-
fects of relative export price changes and undervaluation remain negative and positive, respectively,
although these are statistically insignicant in both cases.
23Following other growth studies, I also included the lagged value of national GDP (RGDPNA_AV Et 1) to
capture convergence e¤ects. This coe¢ cient, although correctly signed, was statistically insignicant at the 10
percent level in this and other regressions. I subsequently dropped this variable.
24One could argue, in the spirit of the BPCG framework, that world growth itself boosts investment, and that the
results above reect this channel. But if this is the case, then, in a regression of the form:
RGDPNA_GROWTH = 0 + 1WORLD_RGDPNA_GROWTH
+2RKNA_GROWTH + 3WORLD_RGDPNA_GROWTHt 1 + 
the coe¢ cient on 2 should decline and turn insignicant since the e¤ect of investment that originates from world
demand growth would be captured, at least partially, by 3. However, running such a regression leaves 2 unchanged,
strongly suggesting that other mechanisms are at work.
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As discussed while deriving eqs. (16), (17), and (20), some of the variables in our sample
could potentially be endogenous in the sense that these are jointly determined with the dependent
variable. For example, relative prices may not be exogenous to world income growth and domestic
investment. Moreover, some of the variables are likely to exhibit hysteresis or persistence over time.
To explore the robustness of the baseline OLS estimates to potential endogeneity/simultaneity
issues, I therefore, carry out dynamic panel estimations using the Arellano-Bover General Method
of Moments (GMM) approach. I specify the second and third lags of the dependent variable as
instruments in addition to the third lags of the explanatory variables. Consistent with the earlier
OLS strategy, I specify cross-section xed e¤ects. The Sargan test of overidentifying restrictions
is employed to test the validity of the instruments. The long-run coe¢ cients are now calculated
as the sum of individual coe¢ cients divided by one minus the coe¢ cient on the lagged dependent
variable.
Column (8) presents the GMM results. Coe¢ cients for both scale variables continue to be
positive, although that forWORLD_RGDPNA_GROWTH is smaller and no longer statistically
signicant (the p-value is 0.83). Moreover, controlling for endogeneity via the GMM approach
makes both relative price variables statistically signicant. The relative price of exports now appears
with a large and negative coe¢ cient while that of undervaluation is positive. Unlike the OLS
estimates, both are statistically signicant, perhaps reecting the successful use of instruments.
Finally, let us return for a moment to an earlier reference to the relationship between the real
exchange rate and growth. As mentioned earlier, there is some evidence pointing towards a positive
e¤ect of real undervaluation on growth. Do our data concur? A thorough investigation is beyond
the scope of this study but Table 5, which presents (non-standardized and standardized) OLS
and GMM estimates provides some preliminary support. A one standard deviation rise in the
degree of undervaluation raises investment growth by 0.14 standard deviations. An implication is
that investment may provide one of the underlying mechanisms through which real undervaluation
boosts growth.
In sum, although both world growth and the growth of domestic accumulation have positive
e¤ects on country growth, the OLS and GMM estimates indicate that the e¤ect of the latter is
much larger. The component plus residual residual plot shown in Figure 6, which is based on
column (5) of Table 4 helps illustrate this conditional e¤ect. The GMM estimate for the long-
run coe¢ cient of WORLD_RGDPNA_GROWTH is statistically insignicant. Moreover, there
is some preliminary evidence that the e¤ect of investment growth partially originates from real
undervaluation. These results were partly anticipated by the correlation matrix (Table 3) and the
scatter plot presented in Figure 1.
6.1 The case of China
Finally, lets turn again to China in order to highlight the shortcomings that almost all existing
empirical studies of the BPCG framework may be subject to. Given the limited number of degrees
of freedom, I follow other BPCG studies in turning to annual data. Unsurprisingly, Figure 7 shows
that the negative and positive correlations between Chinese growth and world growth on the one
hand and Chinese growth and accumulation on the other that we rst saw in Figures 2 survive the
switch to annual data.
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Table 4: OLS Growth regressions: 1950-2011
Dependent variable: RGDPNA_GROWTH  (Growth rate of real GDP)a
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
OLS OLS OLS OLS OLS OLS OLS GMM
Standardized Standardized
Constant 0.016 -0.005 -0.006 -0.005 0.007
(0.007) (0.429) (0.328) (0.361) (0.093)
RGPDPNA_AVE t-1 -1.78E-09
(0.139)
WORLD_RGDPNA_GROWTH t 0.546 0.479 0.150 0.489 0.482 0.336 0.111 0.211
(0.003) (0.005) (0.003) (0.003) (0.062) (0.111)
RKNA_GROWTH t 0.583 0.553 0.586 0.581 0.695 0.719 0.899
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
RPLX_GROWTH t -0.016 -0.018 0.004 0.004 -0.267
(0.536) (0.492) (0.796) (0.049)
LNUNDERVAL t 0.004 0.013 0.169 0.086
(0.330) (0.000) (0.000)
WORLD_RGDPNA_GROWTH t-1 0.001 0.001 -0.1667
(0.991) (0.319)
RKNA_GROWTH t-1 -0.247 -0.258 -0.499
(0.000) (0.000)
RPLX_GROWTH t-1 -0.021 -0.021 -0.387
(0.355) (0.137)
LNUNDERVAL t-1 -0.009 -0.118 -0.052
(0.048) (0.000)
RGDPNA_GROWTH t-1 0.228
(0.004)
Time Dummies no no no no no no no no
Country Dummies yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes
Long-run coefficients
WORLD_RGDPNA_GROWTH 0.337 0.112 0.057
p-value (0.005) (0.005) (0.831)
RKNA_GROWTH 0.448 0.461 0.518
p-value (0.005) (0.005) (0.016)
RPLX -0.017 -0.017 -0.847
p-value (0.499) (0.499) (0.031)
LNUNDERVAL 0.004 0.051 0.044
p-value (0.159) (0.159) (0.009)
Adjusted R-squared 0.173 0.393 0.393 0.394 0.395 0.492 0.492
J-statistic 10.953
Instrument rank 20
Sargan test (p-value) 0.447
Cross-sections included 167 167 167 167 167 167 167 144
Observations 1432 1423 1423 1420 1420 1253 1253 920
a p-values in parentheses
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Figure 6: Component plus residual for RKNA_GROWTH based on Column (5) of Table
Growth_OLS.
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Table 5: The e¤ect of real undervaluation on investment growth
Dependent variable: RKNA_GROWTH  (Growth rate of capital stock)a
(1) (2) (3)
OLS OLS GMM
Standardized
Constant 0.043
(0.000)
RKNA_GROWTH t-1 0.656
(0.000)
LNUNDERVAL t 0.004 0.046 0.006
(0.553) (0.864)
LNUNDERVAL t-1 0.006 0.081 0.055
(0.513) (0.335)
LNUNDERVAL t-2 0.001 0.012 -0.030
(0.865) (0.222)
Time Dummies yes yes yes
Country Dummies yes yes yes
Long-run coefficients
LNUNDERVAL 0.011 0.139 0.090
p-value (0.010) (0.029)
Adjusted R-squared 0.40 0.41
J-statistic
Instrument rank
Sargan test (p-value)
Cross-sections included 167 167 143
Observations 1238 1238 904
a p-values in parentheses
20
-.02
.00
.02
.04
.06
.08
.10
.12
.14
-.3 -.2 -.1 .0 .1 .2
D(LOG(RGDPNA))
D
(L
O
G
(W
O
R
LD
_R
G
D
PN
A)
)
.00
.02
.04
.06
.08
.10
.12
.14
-.3 -.2 -.1 .0 .1 .2
D(LOG(RGDPNA))
D
(L
O
G
(R
KN
A)
)
Figure 7: Scattterplots for annual Chinese GDP growth versus: (1) world GDP growth, (2) accu-
mulation growth. Source: PWT 8.0.
Table 6 presents estimates of the determinants of Chinese growth. In keeping with the spirit
of the BPCG model, my focus is long run. Now, however, I am using annual data so that the use
of cointegration techniques with variables dened in the form of log levels instead of growth rates
is an obvious choice. I, therefore, use three di¤erent cointegration techniques: (1) the dynamic
OLS (DOLS) with two leads and lags, (2) the Fully Modied OLS (FMOLS) with two lags, and
(3) the Canonical Cointegrating Regressions (CCR) technique, again with two lags. The results
reveal something interesting. As seen from columns (1), (3), and (5), world growth has a positive
e¤ect on Chinese growth as long as the latter is the only explanatory variable used (in addition to a
deterministic trend); in other words, as long as we follow a number of BPCG studies in estimating
a version of equation (5). However, as soon as the other variables suggested by equation (20)
are included, the statistical signicance of world growth for Chinese growth collapses.25 Capital
accumulation remains signicant throughout (see columns (2), (4), and (6)), and the coe¢ cient is
stable (it ranges from 0.99-1.17). The export and import price coe¢ cients yield the expected signs
with the exception of the FMOLS estimates, with greater price competitiveness being positively
associated with growth, although in most cases the coe¢ cient is statistically insignicant. Finally,
the coe¢ cient of LNUNDERV AL is consistently positive and highly precisely estimated. The
coe¢ cient varies from 0.26 to 0.39. The relative price of tradables plays an important role in the
Chinese case, suggesting that this is the appropriate variable to investigate rather than the relative
export price.
In sum, looking at the case of China in isolation, we nd more evidence that excluding capital
25Notice that, now that I have increased degrees of freedom thanks to annual data, I use individual prices instead
of the relative export price. This does away with the assumption of homogeneity in relative prices. Using relative
prices instead does not qualititatively a¤ect the results regarding the scale variables.
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accumulation and relative prices may yield misleading results about the robustness of world demand
as a determinant of country growth.
Table 6: Estimates for China based on three di¤erent cointegration methods: 1950-2011
Dependent variable: RGDPNA_GROWTH  (Growth rate of real GDP)a
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
DOLS DOLS FMOLS FMOLS CCR CCR
Constant -17.082 -4.142 -2034564 -0.818 -16.347 -3.634
(0.000) (0.196) (0.272) (0.790) (0.004) (0.226)
LOG(WORLD_RGDPNA) 1.809 0.139 0.173 -0.193 1.78 -0.023
(0.000) (0.549) (0.002) (0.411) (0.000) (0.920)
LOG(RKNA) 0.987 1.172 1.153
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
LOG(PL_X) -1.506 0.312 -0.149
(0.010) (0.455) (0.712)
LOG(PL_M) 1.325 -0.619 -0.312
(0.024) (0.129) (0.421)
LNUNDERVAL 0.386 0.259 0.330
(0.000) (0.001) (0.000)
Adjusted R-squared 0.936 0.998 0.792 0.994 0.934 0.990
Leads 2 2
Lags 2 2 2 2 2 2
Observations 57 55 60 59 60 59
a p-values in parentheses
7 Concluding remarks
Any test of the BPCG hypothesis is, at least partly, a test of whether or not the current account
is balanced over the long run. Or, rather more interestingly, it is an exercise in identifying the
adjustment mechanisms that ensure that the current account is balanced over the long-run. The
adjustment mechanisms could arise from the demand or supply side. The BPCG tradition has em-
phasized the demand side. However, there is something unsatisfactory about testing the hypothesis
that demand matters by estimating the demand side only. Doing so creates logical and econometric
problems, as does the conceptual treatment of relative prices. It is arguably better to incorporate
both supply and demand side factors in a broader framework and then explore mechanisms that
drive adjustment so that the balance of payments constraint is satised (the latter being a plausible
working hypothesis).
In this paper, I have made the case that a reasonable test of the BPCG hypothesis should:
(1) incorporate both supply and demand side e¤ects
(2) treat both the changes and levels of prices seriously, the former as endogenous variables, and
(3) study issues of causation, especially that between world demand growth, output growth,
capital accumulation, and relative prices.
I presented a framework that attempts to satisfy these requirements. Using a di¤erent approach
to the question of whether it is world demand that constrains growth through the trade balance
22
raises questions about the empirical validity of the BPCG framework. In particular, it highlights
the expectation that factors other than world demand growth may be crucial in many countries,
even though standard tests of the BPCG hypothesis may suggest otherwise. Future work should
explore alternative mechanisms more carefully. Moreover, it would be interesting to explore the
characteristics of countries that render di¤erent factors salient. Such work may help reconcile the
accumulating evidence that real undervaluation and relative prices matter with empirical support
for the BPCG hypothesis.26
8 Appendix: Deriving the index of real exchange rate mis-
alignment
I follow the three-step methodology pursued by Rodrik (2008) to obtain an index of real exchange
rate undervaluation. Using data from Penn World Tables 8.0, I rst calculate the real exchange rate
(RER) as the inverse of PLGDPE (price level of expenditure-side real GDP at current PPPs in
mil. 2005US$), which in turn is the ratio of the purchasing power parity conversion factor (PPP )
to the nominal exchange rate (XR) . The latter two variables are expressed as units of domestic
currency per US dollar. All the variables are averaged over 5 year intervals. However, since PPP
is calculated over the entire national output, the basket includes non-tradables for which we do not
expect the law of one price to hold. Thus, in order to calculate equilibrium real exchange rates,
in a second step I adjust for the Balassa-Samuelson (BS) e¤ect, regressing RER on real GDP per
capita (RGDPE_PC):
lnRERit = +  lnRGDPE_PCit + ft + "it (22)
where i and t are country and time indexes, respectively, ft accounts for time xed e¤ects, and
"it is the error term. I obtain an estimate of b =  0:14, with a t-statistic of 15.1. The sign of the
coe¢ cient is in line with the Balassa-Samuelson prediction; a 10% increase in RGDPE_PC is asso-
ciated with a 1.4% real appreciation. Finally, I dene the undervaluation index (UNDERV AL) as
the ratio of actual to BS-adjusted real exchange rates: UNDERV ALit = RERit=\RERit. Dened
in index form, UNDERV AL is comparable across countries and over time; when it exceeds unity,
the domestic currency is undervalued in real terms (i.e., domestic goods are cheap in international
dollar terms). The log of this variable (lnUNDERV AL) has a zero mean and a standard deviation
of 0.42.
In the case of China, I used the coe¢ cients derived from the 5-year averaged sample to calculate
\RERit for individual years.
NOTES
 In terms of the BPCG idea, a country with high income elasticity of demand for exports ()
and low income elasticity of demand for imports () should grow faster than ROW given a
positive rate of world growth but also grow slower during periods of negative world growth.
Do we see this pattern in the data?
26And indeed with the Kaldorian cumulative causation model in which increased competitiveness via relative price
changes plays a major role.
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 In the canonical BPCG model, if X + M   1 = 0; but P^X   P^M   E^ 6= 0, Y^BPCG3 reduces
to
Y^BPCG3 =
(1  M )(P^X   P^M   E^) + X^
M
(23)
 Do countries that specialize in manufactures have higher X and lower M on average?
 Consider using the end of the MFA as a natural experiment
 So then why do empirical studies of the BPCG hypothesis nd that world growth is robustly
correlated with domestic growth? May be partially capturing the e¤ects coming from domes-
tic investment. The expression for Y^ in a general equilibrium framework shows why there
could be a common trend between Y^  and K^. Notice in the particular the expression (X +
"X)"M+(1 X)"X that both the denominators for the coe¢ cients of Y^  and K^ share in the re-
duced form solution for Y^ (see eq. 20) of the le BPCG_Contrasting_Elasticities_More.tex).
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